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Building on the strengths of the first edition, the second edition of the Irwin Nicomachean Ethics features a revised translation (with little editorial intervention), expanded notes (including a summary of the argument of each chapter), an expanded Introduction, and a revised glossary.
Duckworth, 1977); and J. Anton and A. Preus (eds.), Aristotle's Ethics: Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy, vol. 4 (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991). Other helpful books include Julia Annas, The Morality of Happiness (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993) (on ancient views of happiness, including that of Aristotle); David Charles, Aristotle's Philosophy of Action (London: Duckworth, 1984); John Cooper, Reason and Human Good in Aristotle (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
account in our reasoning, or rather, perhaps, the fact that there is a puzzle about whether the dead can partake of any good or evil. For it 1101b does seem, from what we have said, that if anything good or bad does actually affect them, it will be pretty unimportant and insigni®cant, either in itself or in relation to them; or if not, it must at least be of such an extent and kind as not to make happy those who are not happy already nor to deprive those who are happy of their being blessed. So
the honours ± is pleasant, but, since they are ¯esh and blood, being hit is distressing and painful, as is all the hard exercise they do; and because of the number of these painful things, what they are aiming at, being small, seems to have nothing pleasant in it. And so, if this is true of courage as well, death and wounds will be painful for the courageous person, and he will face them involuntarily, but he will stand his ground against them because it is noble, or shameful not to. And the more
ground that he has perpetrated an injustice against the city. Again, in so far as the person acting unjustly is merely unjust and not altogether bad, it is impossible for him to treat himself unjustly (this is different from the other type of injustice, in that there is a sense in which the unjust person is wicked in the same way as the cowardly person, not by possessing wickedness in its entirety, so that his acting unjustly is not in accordance with wickedness in its entirety either). For this
are pursuing their own advantage. Nor do such people live in each other's company very much; for sometimes they do not even ®nd each other pleasant. They have no further need of such association, unless they are useful to each other, because each ®nds the other pleasant only to the extent that he hopes for some good from him. In this class people also put the friendship between host and guest. Friendship between the young seems to be for pleasure, since they live in accordance with their