The Cambridge Companion to Greek and Roman Philosophy (Cambridge Companions to Philosophy)
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This wide-ranging introduction to the study of philosophy in the ancient world surveys the period's developments and evaluates a comprehensive series of major thinkers, ranging from Pythagoras to Epicurus. Tables, illustrations, and extensive advice on further reading contribute to an ideal book for survey courses on the history of ancient philosophy. It will be an invaluable guide for those interested in the philosophical thought of a rich and formative period.
proof. Near the beginning of his vast Proof of the Gospel he writes thus: They say that we provide nothing by way of proof but require that those who come to us rely on trust alone. Against this slander the present treatise may be a not irrational reply. (Proof of the Gospel i 1.12–13) The suggestion that Christianity is a philosophy of trust is a slander. Eusebius was not the last Christian to vaunt his probative prowess, nor the first. Justin, who was martyred under the Emperor Hadrian, is his
world of plurality and change – was riddled with contradictions more lethal than might be suggested by Parmenides’ rather swift and compressed strictures on ‘mortal opinion’? Or are the paradoxes conceived less as demonstrations than as proto-sceptical questions? Whatever the objections to the Eleatic one, is the hypothesis of plurality and change any less objectionable? Indeed, for all its apparent validation by experience, is it any less of a hypothesis, any less in need of rational defence,
of the constitution of bone there is a closer approximation than in any other of his predecessors to an understanding of the role of form and essence in physical explanation. On this upbeat note we too may appropriately take our leave of the Presocratics. notes 1 2 3 4 5 All citations are by KRS number where available (i.e. as in Kirk, Raven and Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers; see Bibliography ), whose version of the Greek text is followed except where specifically noted
passive principle, called ‘matter’ (hyle), acted upon; and an active principle, variously called ‘reason’ (logos again) and ‘god’, which interpenetrates it and, by acting on it, shapes it into the four phenomenal elements, earth, water, air and fire, out of which in turn all more complex entities are formed. Matter and god are theoretical constructs, each of them representing one half of the official hallmark of body, its capacity to act or be acted upon. Matter, as the purely passive partner, is
attention has focused on his answers to two recurrent charges made against Pyrrhonist scepticism: that it is theoretically inconsistent, and that it makes practical life impossible. The Sextan Sceptic on the one hand avoids all dogma – a word used to designate not all belief, but any doctrinal view on a disputed issue – and on the other hand non-committally acquiesces in passive ‘appearances’ (phainomena). Whether this is a policy that aims to avoid all belief, and, if it is, whether it succeeds