The Conflicts of Modernity in Ludwig Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (European Studies in Theology, Philosophy and History of Religions)
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The author offers a new look at one of the most influential books in the history of philosophy: Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. He presents the Tractatus as expressing the intellectual anxieties of its modernist epoch. The most intriguing but usually unanswered question concerning the Tractatus is why Wittgenstein had to think that only propositions of natural science have meaning. The author reviews the most popular interpretations of the Tractatus and comes to the conclusion that the early Wittgenstein was an ethical subjectivist. With this insight, he solves the tension between Tractarian theses that influenced neopositivism and its mystical part.
the truth of (1*) and the existence of ENA in the Tractatus. I do not think that Pears’ interpretation assumes the truth of (1*); it merely shows that TLP 3.24 is neutral with respect to the gappy and the gapless account. Both the adherent of the gapless account, like Zalabardo, as well as the adherent of the gappy account, like Pears, are able to reconcile this thesis with their reading of the Tractatus. In the case of the interpretation that I defend in this dissertation, there is nothing
Massenteilchen gekennzeichneten Punkte des Raumes zu zwei verschiedenen Zeiten fallen zusammen, wenn die Zeiten zusammenfallen” (Hertz 1894, p. 54). “The function of mass-particles at this point is just to mark uniquely a space-time location, so that such points are countable. That is only what is required to define a concept of mass” (Grasshof 1997, p. 105). “Die Zahl der Massenteilchen in einem beliebigen Raume, verglichen mit der Zahl der Massenteilchen, welche sich in einem festgesetzten
intensional contexts does not mean that the self does not exist. If Wittgenstein was inclined towards such a strong thesis, this could mean two things: either he thought that the theory of judgement is the only way for arguing in favour of the existence of the self (this hypothesis I reject because, as we will see in the next chapter, Wittgenstein saw, at least at some point of writing the Notebooks, the possibility of arguing in favour of the existence of the self on the basis of the existence
concept of the soul) are empty, and that the world is completely described by natural science is a witness to times when it is becoming clear that philosophy cannot fulfil the task that Descartes put upon it. Ontotheology is helpless when it comes 370 “And as regards the soul, even though many authors have judged that it is very difficult to discover its nature, and some have even dared to say that human reasoning convinces us that it perishes along with the body, and that we believe the
propositions belongs to symbolism. But just as the question whether there is 35 McGuinness 2002, p. 91. 36 TLP 4.0031. 37 The proponents of the formalistic reading indicate that this sentence is a frequent motif in Wittgenstein’s early writings: NB 22.8.14, p. 2; 2.9.14, p. 2; 3.9.14, p. 2; 13.10.14, p. 11; 26.4.15, p. 43. 38 McGinn 2007, p. 210. “The simple objects (…) are not so much a kind of metaphysical entity conjured up to support a logical theory as something whose existence adds no